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Abstract. The simple security property in an information flow policy
can be enforced by encrypting data objects and distributing an appro-
priate secret to each user. A user derives a suitable decryption key from
the secret and publicly available information. A chain-based enforce-
ment scheme provides an alternative method of cryptographic enforce-
ment that does not require any public information, the trade-off being
that a user may require more than one secret. For a given information
flow policy, there will be many different possible chain-based enforcement
schemes. In this paper, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for se-
lecting a chain-based scheme which uses the minimum possible number
of secrets. We also compute the number of secrets that will be required
and establish an upper bound on the number of secrets required by any
user.
1 Introduction
Access control is a fundamental security service in modern computing systems
and seeks to restrict the interactions between users of the system and the re-
sources provided by the system. Generally speaking, access control is policy-
based, in the sense that a policy is defined by the resource owner(s) specifying
those interactions that are authorized. An attempt by a user to interact with a
protected resource, typically called an access request, is evaluated by a trusted
software component, the policy decision point (or authorization decision func-
tion), to determine whether the request should be permitted (if authorized) or
denied (otherwise). The use of a policy decision point is entirely appropriate
when we can assume the policy will be enforced by the same organization that
defined it. However, use of third-party storage, privacy policies controlling access
to personal data, and digital rights management all give rise to scenarios where
this assumption does not hold.
An alternative approach to policy enforcement, and one that has attracted
considerable interest in recent years, is to encrypt the protected object and enable
authorized users to derive decryption keys. This approach is particularly suitable
for data that changes infrequently, for read-only policies, and for policies that can
be represented in terms of user attributes. Research into cryptographic access
control began with the seminal work of Akl and Taylor [2] on the enforcement of
information flow policies, and has seen a resurgence of interest in recent years.
2Generally, it is undesirable to provide a user with all the keys she requires
to decrypt protected objects. Instead, a user is given a small number of secrets
from which she is able to derive all keys required. Thus a cryptographic enforce-
ment scheme may be characterized by(i) the number of secrets each user has
to store, (ii) the total number of secrets, (iii) the amount of auxiliary (public)
information required for key derivation, and (iv) the amount of time required
for key derivation.
Many schemes in the literature provide each user with a single secret [3, 11],
the trade-off being that the amount of public information and derivation time
may be substantial. In contrast, chain-based schemes require no public infor-
mation but each user may require more than one secret [9, 14, 15]. In addition,
chain-based schemes can achieve very strong security properties [15]. There are
many different ways to instantiate a chain-based scheme for a given policy, each
instantiation being defined by a chain partition of the partially ordered set that
defines the policy.
However, existing work on chain-based CESs assumes the existence of a chain
partition and simply generates the required secrets and keys for this partition [9,
14, 15]. This approach ignores the fact that there will be (exponentially) many
choices of chain partition. Thus, it is important, if we are to make best use
of chain-based CESs, that we know which chain partition to use for a given
information flow policy. It is this issue that we address in this paper.
Contributions. Our first contribution (Theorem 2) is to show how K̂(Π), the
(total) number of secrets for a chain partition Π , is related to the set of edges in
the representation of Π as an acyclic directed graph. We then prove that K̂(Π)
is determined by the end-points of the chains in Π (Lemma 2). This, in turn,
allows us to prove there exists a chain partition that simultaneously minimizes
the number of secrets required and the number of chains in the partition (The-
orem 3). The last result is somewhat unexpected, as it is not usually possible to
simultaneously minimize two different parameters. The result is also of practical
importance, since the number of chains in Π provides a tight upper bound on
the number of secrets required by any one user. Our main contribution (Theo-
rem 1 and Section 4) is to develop a polynomial-time algorithm that enables us
to find a chain partition Π such that K̂(Π) and the number of chains is mini-
mized (with respect to all chain partitions). Our algorithm is based on finding
an optimal feasible flow in a network and makes use of the characterization of
the number of secrets in terms of the set of edges (established in Theorem 2) to
define the capacities of the edges in the network. We thereby provide rigorous
foundations for the development of efficient chain-based enforcement schemes.
Paper structure. In the next section, we provide the relevant background on
cryptographic enforcement schemes, formally define the problem, and state The-
orem 1. In Sec. 3, we state and prove Theorems 2 and 3 and Lemma 2. In Sec. 4,
we develop an efficient algorithm to derive the best chain partition and prove
Theorem 1. We conclude the paper with a summary of our contributions and
some ideas for future work.
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Fig. 1: The Hasse diagram of a simple poset
2 Background and Problem Statement
A partially ordered set (or poset) is a pair (X,6), where 6 is a reflexive, anti-
symmetric, transitive binary relation onX . We may write x > y whenever y 6 x,
and y < x whenever y 6 x and y 6= x. Given a poset (X,6), it is convenient to
introduce the following notation.
↓x
def
= {y ∈ X : y 6 x} and ↑x
def
= {y ∈ X : y > x}
We will also make use of the following terminology and notation.
– We say x covers y, denoted y ⋖ x, if y < x and there does not exist z ∈ X
such that y < z < x. We say y is a child of x if y ⋖ x (and x is a parent of
y).
– The Hasse diagram of a poset is the directed acyclic graph H = (X,E0),
where xy ∈ E0 if and only if y ⋖ x.
– X is a tree if no element of X has more than one parent and X has a unique
maximum element.
– Y ⊆ X is a chain (or total order) if for x, y ∈ Y , x < y or x = y or y < x.
{C1, . . . , Cℓ} is a chain partition (of (X,6)) if Ci ⊆ X is a chain, Ci∩Cj = ∅
if i 6= j, and C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cℓ = X .
– Y ⊆ X is an antichain if for x, y ∈ Y , x 6 y if and only if x = y. (In other
words, for x 6= y in an antichain, x 6 y and y 6 x.) The width of a poset is
the cardinality of an antichain of maximum size.
An illustrative Hasse diagram is shown in Fig. 1. In the poset depicted,
{a, d, f} is a chain, for example, and {d, e} is an antichain of maximum size.
Thus the width of this poset is 2 and one chain partition of cardinality 2 is
{{a, c, e, g, h} , {b, d, f}}.
Definition 1. An information flow policy is a tuple (X,6, U,O, λ), where:
– (X,6) is a (finite) partially ordered set of security labels;
– U is a set of users and O is a set of objects;
– λ : U ∪ O → X is a security function that associates users and objects with
security labels.
4The simple security property requires that user u ∈ U can read an object o ∈ O
if and only if λ(u) > λ(o).
We may define an equivalence relation ∼ on U , where u ∼ v if and only if
λ(u) = λ(v). We write Ux to denote {u ∈ U : λ(u) = x}; U is partitioned into the
set of equivalence classes {Ux : x ∈ X}. Similarly, Ox ⊆ O is the set of objects
having security label x ∈ X . Thus, the simple security property guarantees that
any o ∈ Ox can be read by a user u ∈ Uy for any y > x. Conversely, u ∈ Uy can
read o ∈ Ox for any x 6 y. Henceforth, we will represent an information flow
policy (X,6, U,O, λ) as a pair (X,6) with the tacit understanding that U , O
and λ are given.
2.1 Cryptographic Enforcement of Information Flow Policies
One way of enforcing the simple security property (for policy (X,6)) is to en-
crypt o ∈ Oy with a (symmetric) key k(y) and provide all users in Ux, where
x > y with the key k(y). An alternative is to provide a user u in Ux with a
smaller number of keys (typically a single key for label x) and enable u to derive
keys for all y such that y < x. However, this introduces the possibility that users
may be able to collude and use their keys to derive a key that no single user
could derive.
More formally, there exists the notion of a cryptographic enforcement scheme
(CES), defined by the SetUp and Derive algorithms, SetUp being used to gen-
erate secrets and keys and the data used to derive secrets and keys, and Derive
being used to compute secrets and keys. Let K denote an arbitrary key space
(typically K = {0, 1}l for some l ∈ N). Then SetUp and Derive have the following
characteristics.
– SetUp takes as input a security parameter ρ and information flow policy
(X,6).
It outputs, for each element x ∈ X , a pair (σ(x), κ(x)): the secret σ(x) is
given to all users in Ux; σ(x) is used to derive secrets and/or keys for labels
y 6 x; and the key κ(x) ∈ K is used to encrypt data objects in Ox.
The SetUp algorithm also outputs a set of public information Pub, which is
used for the derivation of secrets and keys.
– Derive takes as input (X,6), Pub, start and end points x, y ∈ X and σ(x).
It outputs κ(y) ∈ K if and only if y 6 x. (In particular, κ(x) can be derived
from σ(x).)
The requirement that Derive outputs κ(y) (given σ(x)) if y 6 x is a correct-
ness criterion, which ensures an authorized user can derive the keys required
to decrypt objects. We also require a security criterion. Informally, the strong
key-indistinguishability criterion requires the following.
There is no polynomial time algorithm, given z ∈ X , a set of secrets
σ(Y ) = {σ(y) : y ∈ Y } such that z 6 y for any y ∈ Y , and κ(x) for all
x 6= z (and the public information Pub), that can distinguish between
κ(z) and a random key in K.
5That is, an adversary cannot distinguish a key from random unless it may be
computed from one of the secrets or keys known to the adversary (which im-
plies, in particular, that the adversary can only compute such a key if it can be
computed from one of those secrets); see Freire et al. [15] for further details.
2.2 Chain-based Enforcement
For certain classes of cryptographic enforcement schemes, public information is
not required. In particular, if X is a chain, then (by definition) there is a unique
directed path from x to y (in the Hasse diagram of X) whenever y < x. Then
for y ⋖ x, we may define the secret σ(y) to be F (σ(x)), and κ(y) = H(σ(y)),
where F and H are suitable one-way functions. Thus, if y < x, there exist
z1, . . . , zℓ ∈ X with y = z1 ⋖ z2 ⋖ · · · ⋖ zℓ = x; κ(y) may be derived from σ(x)
by iteratively deriving σ(zi) = F (σ(zi+1)), i = ℓ − 1, . . . , 1, and then deriving
κ(y) = H(σ(y)) = H(σ(z1)).
This observation has led to the development of chain-based CESs [9, 14, 15]
for arbitrary information flow policies. The basic idea is to partition the infor-
mation flow policy (X,6) into chains and then construct multiple CESs, one for
each chain.
More formally, let (X,6) be a poset and C = x1 > x2 > · · · > xm be a chain
in X . Then we say any chain of the form xj > xj+1 > · · · > xm, 1 6 j 6 m, is
a suffix of C; the empty chain is (vacuously) also a suffix of C.
Proposition 1. For all x ∈ X and any chain C ⊆ X, ↓x ∩ C is a suffix of C.
The above result (due to Crampton et al. [9, Proposition 4]) enables us to
define, for a given chain partition Π , the secrets that should be given to a user
u ∈ Ux, since ↓x defines the labels for which u is authorized. Given a chain
partition Π = {C1, . . . , Cℓ}, {↓x ∩ C1, . . . , ↓x ∩Cℓ} is a disjoint collection of
chain suffixes. Hence, a user in Ux must be given the secrets for the maximal
elements in the non-empty suffixes ↓x∩C1, . . . , ↓x∩Cℓ. Thus, any user requires
at most ℓ secrets. Let φ(x,Π) ⊆ X denote this set of maximal elements. (Clearly,
x ∈ φ(x,Π) for all chain partitions Π and all x ∈ X .)
Remark 1. Let w be the width of a poset (X,6). Clearly, (X,6) cannot have a
chain partition with less than w chains. Dilworth’s theorem asserts that there
exists a chain partition of (X,6) into w chains [13]. Thus, if we can find a chain
partition of X into w chains, no user will require more than w secrets. (If u were
to have more secrets than there are chains in the partition, then there must exist
a chain containing y and z for which u has secrets and one of the secrets may
be derived from the other.)
Freire et al. [15] provide a formal description of the SetUp and Derive algo-
rithms. Informally, the SetUp algorithm performs the following steps:
1. for each chain Ci in Π , select a secret for the top element in Ci and generate
a secret for each element in the chain by applying the one-way function F
to the secret of its parent in Ci;
62. for each element x ∈ X , generate κ(x) by applying the one-way function H
to σ(x);
3. assign the secrets σ(φ(x,Π))
def
= {σ(z) : z ∈ φ(x,Π)} to each user in Ux.
The Derive algorithm performs the following steps, given x, y ∈ X and σ(φ(x,Π)):
1. if x = y, then output H(σ(x));
2. if y < x, then find z ∈ φ(x,Π) such that z > y, so there exist z = z0 ⋗Π
· · ·⋗Π zt = y, and compute F (σ(z0)) = σ(z1), . . . , F (σ(zt−1)) = σ(y); output
H(σ(y)).
This scheme has the strong key-indistinguishability property; see Freire et al. [15]
for further details.
A user in Ux will need to be given |φ(x,Π)| secrets, in contrast to most CESs
in the literature in which each user receives a single secret [3, 11]. However, chain-
based CESs have substantial benefits:(i) they require no public information [9];
(ii) they can use cryptographic primitives that are very easy to compute; and
(iii) it is easy to construct schemes with the strong key-indistinguishability prop-
erty [15].
2.3 Problem Statement
Certain aspects of chain-based CESs are not well understood. As we have already
noted, some users will require multiple secrets, each of which corresponds to a
unique label in X . In particular, a user u in Ux will require a secret for each chain
that contains an element y such that y < x. Three chain partitions of the poset in
Fig. 1 are shown in Fig. 2. We have, for example, φ(g,Π1) = {b, e, g}, φ(g,Π2) =
{b, d, g}, and φ(g,Π3) = {d, g}. Hence, the number of secrets required, on a per-
user basis and in total, will vary, depending on the chain partition chosen. Thus,
considering various chain partitions of X , we may ask:
– How do we minimize kmax, the maximum number of secrets a user may
require?
– How do we minimize K, the total number of secrets required?
– How do we minimize K̂, the total number of secrets that need to be issued
to users?
More formally, given a chain partition Π of (X,6), we may regard φ as a
function from X to 2X that is completely determined by Π . Thus, given a chain
partition Π , we can define the following values.
kmax(Π)
def
= max {|φ(x,Π)| : x ∈ X}
K(Π)
def
=
∑
x∈X
|φ(x,Π)|
K̂(Π)
def
=
∑
x∈X
|Ux| · |φ(x,Π)|
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Fig. 2: Three chain partitions of the poset in Fig. 1
Values of kmax and K for the chain partitions in Fig. 2 are shown in Table 1;
node h is used for illustrative purposes.1
Partition φ(h) kmax K
Π1 {b, e, g, h} 4 20
Π2 {b, f, h} 3 17
Π3 {g, h} 2 13
Table 1: φ(h), kmax and K for the chain partitions in Fig. 2
The important question is: Can we minimize these parameters (over all
choices of chain partition Π for X)? In short, given an information flow pol-
icy (X,6), how do we determine Π for use in a chain-based CES?2 It is this
question we address in the remainder of the paper. In particular, at the end of
Section 4, we prove the following result.
Theorem 1. Let (X,6) be an information flow policy of width w and let K̂
denote the minimum number of secrets required by a chain-based enforcement
scheme for X. Then in O(|X |4w) time, we can find a chain partition Π for
which the corresponding chain-based enforcement scheme only requires K̂ secrets
and kmax 6 w.
1 Note that we can deduce K from K̂ by letting |Ux| = 1 for all x ∈ X.
2 Crampton et al. [9] observed that further research was needed to identify the best
choice of chain partition for a given information flow policy. While subsequent re-
search has formalized [14] and strengthened the security properties of chain-based
CESs [15], we are not aware of any research that specifies how to select a chain
partition.
8Remark 2. We assume throughout that our information flow policy has a maxi-
mum element. We may assume this without loss of generality: given an informa-
tion flow policy (X,6) without a maximum element, we simply add a maximum
element r and define r ⋗m for all maximal elements m in X ; no users are as-
signed to r. Observe that such a transformation does not affect the values of
kmax and K̂.
3 Computing kmax and K̂
Informally, we take a poset (X,6) and construct a second poset (X,6′), where
x <′ y implies x < y (but x < y does not necessarily imply x <′ y). We will say
6′ is contained in 6. In particular, any chain partition Π of (X,6) defines a
second poset (X,6Π), where x <Π y if and only if x and y belong to the same
chain and x < y; thus 6Π is contained in 6 for any Π . Note, however, that
x⋖Π y does not necessarily imply x⋖ y.
3
Given a poset (X,6) and z < y, we define
γ(yz) = {x ∈ X : x > z, x 6> y} .
Thus z ∈ γ(yz) and y 6∈ γ(yz). For the maximum element r ∈ X and any
y, z ∈ X such that z < y, r 6∈ γ(yz). Informally, the intuition behind γ is that
its cardinality measures the “damage” that would be done by creating a chain
partition Π such that z⋖Π y, because having z⋖Π y means that z 6 Π x for any
x ∈ γ(yz). Thus, every user in Ux will require an extra secret in order to derive
κ(z). We will capture this intuition more precisely in Lemma 1.
Remark 3. For maximum element r and any chain partition Π = {C1, . . . , Cℓ},
φ(r,Π) = {t1, . . . , tℓ}, where ti is the maximum element in chain Ci. Moreover,
r = ti for some i. Hence, we can construct a tree Π˜ = (X,6Π˜), where y ⋖Π˜ x
if and only if one of the following conditions holds:(i) y = tj , j 6= i, and x = r;
(ii) y ⋖Π x.
Figure 3 illustrates the construction of two such trees, using chain partitions
from Fig. 2; the arcs used to create the trees are shown as dashed lines.
Lemma 1. Let (X,6) be a poset and let Π be a chain partition of X. Then,
for all x, y, z ∈ X such that x 6= r and z ⋖
Π˜
y,
z ∈ φ(x,Π) if and only if x ∈ γ(yz).
Proof. Given z ∈ φ(x,Π) and chain partitionΠ = {C1, . . . , Cℓ}, yi ∈ φ(x,Π) ∩ Ci
if and only if Ci ∩ ↓x is non-empty and yi is the maximum element in Ci ∩ ↓x
(Sec. 2.3). Thus, z 6 x. Moreover, x 6> y (otherwise there would exist t ∈ φ(x)
such that y 6
Π˜
t and hence z ⋖
Π˜
y 6
Π˜
t, violating the condition that z is the
maximum element in the suffix Ci ∩ ↓x). That is, x ∈ γ(yz).
3 To see this, consider the poset of four elements, in which a⋖ b⋖ d and a⋖ c⋖ d with
b 6 c, c 6 b. Then {{b} , {c} , {a, d}} is a chain partition and a⋖Π d, but a 6⋖ d.
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(b) Π˜3
Fig. 3: Creating trees from partitions Π1 and Π3 in Fig. 2
Now suppose x ∈ γ(yz). Then x 6> y, by definition, and hence y does not
belong to ↓x ∩ Ci for any i. However, x > z; hence, there exists t ∈ φ(x) such
that z 6
Π˜
t. Since Π is a chain partition, the only parent of z in Π˜ is y. Hence
it must be the case that z = t (and thus z ∈ φ(x)). ⊓⊔
Let (X,6) be an information flow policy and let y, z ∈ X with z < y. Then,
following Crampton et al. [10], we define
ω(yz)
def
=
∑
x∈γ(yz)
|Ux| .
We will be interested in minimizing the
∑
ω(yz), where the sum is taken over
all pairs (y, z) such that z ⋖
Π˜
y. The intuition behind this definition is that it
captures, in some appropriate sense, the connectivity that is lost from (X,6) by
using (X,6Π). Since every element in (X,6Π) has at most one parent, γ(yz)
represents those elements in X that become “disconnected” from z by defining
z ⋖Π y. The next result establishes an exact correspondence between φ(x,Π)
and γ(yz), and enables us to use network flow techniques to compute a chain
partition that minimizes K̂ (as we explain in Sec. 4).
Theorem 2. Let (X,6Π) be a chain partition of (X,6) with maximum ele-
ment r. Then
K̂(Π) = ℓ |Ur|+
∑
z⋖
Π˜
y
ω(yz)
where ℓ is the number of chains in Π.
Proof. By definition,
K̂(Π) =
∑
x∈X
|Ux| |φ(x,Π)| = |Ur| |φ(r,Π)|+
∑
x∈X\r
∑
z∈X
|Ux| δ(x, z),
10
where δ(x, z) equals 1 if z ∈ φ(x,Π) and 0 otherwise. By Lemma 1, we have
δ(x, z) = 1 if and only if x ∈ γ(yz) for z⋖
Π˜
y. Moreover, y is unique, since Π˜ is
a tree. Therefore,∑
x∈X\r
∑
z∈X
|Ux| δ(x, z) =
∑
z⋖
Π˜
y
∑
x∈γ(yz)
|Ux| =
∑
z⋖
Π˜
y
ω(yz)
As r > x for all x ∈ X , φ(r,Π) must contain exactly one element from each
chain in Π . Therefore |Ur| |φ(r,Π)| = ℓ |Ur|, as required. ⊓⊔
The following result shows that the number of secrets required by a chain
partition can be computed by considering only the minimum elements in the
chain partition.
Lemma 2. Let Π = {C1, . . . , Cℓ} be a chain partition of (X,6) and let chain
Ci have bottom element bi, 1 6 i 6 ℓ. Then
K(Π) =
ℓ∑
i=1
|↑bi| and K̂(Π) =
ℓ∑
i=1
∑
x∈↑bi
|Ux| .
Proof. We have, by definition,
K̂(Π) =
∑
x∈X
|Ux| |φ(x,Π)| =
∑
x∈X
|Ux| |{Ci : Ci ∩ ↓x 6= ∅, 1 6 i 6 ℓ}|
=
∑
x∈X
|Ux| |{bi : x > bi, 1 6 i 6 ℓ}|
=
∑
x∈X
ℓ∑
i=1
|Ux| δ(x, bi) where δ(x, bi) = 1 if x > bi and 0 otherwise
=
ℓ∑
i=1
∑
x∈X
|Ux| δ(x, bi) =
ℓ∑
i=1
∑
x∈↑bi
|Ux|
Clearly, we may prove the result for K in an analogous fashion. ⊓⊔
In Fig. 2a, for example, the bottom elements are a, c, d and f and |↑a| = 8,
|↑c| = 6, |↑d| = 4 and |↑f | = 2. Thus, the number of secrets required in total is
20.
Theorem 3. Let (X,6) be an information flow policy of width w and let K̂
denote the minimum number of secrets required by a chain-based enforcement
scheme for X. Then there exists a chain partition containing w chains such that
K̂(Π) = K̂.
Proof. Let Π be a chain partition of X into t > w chains such that K̂(Π) = K̂
and let B be the set of bottom vertices in the chains of Π . A result of Gallai
and Milgram asserts that if a chain partition Π of a poset (X,6) contains t
chains, where t > w, then there exists a chain partition Π ′ into t − 1 chains
such that the set of bottom vertices in Π ′ is a subset of B [16].4 Hence, by
4 The result is phrased in the language of digraphs, but every poset may be represented
by an equivalent transitive acyclic digraph.
11
iterated applications of the Gallai-Milgram result, there exists a chain partition
Π∗ of width w such that the set of bottom vertices B∗ in Π∗ is a subset of B.
Moreover, by Lemma 2,
K̂(Π∗) =
∑
b∈B∗
∑
x∈↑b
|Ux| 6
∑
b∈B
∑
x∈↑b
|Ux|
By the minimality of K̂, we deduce that K̂(Π∗) = K̂. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let (X,6) be an information flow policy. There exists a chain
partition such that the total number of secrets K̂ is minimized and kmax 6 w.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Theorem 3, the definition of kmax =
max {|φ(x,Π)| : x ∈ X}, and the fact that |φ(x,Π)| is bounded above by the
number of chains in Π for all x ∈ X . ⊓⊔
4 Finding a Chain Partition Requiring K̂ Keys
Suppose (X,6) is a poset of width w. In general, a chain partition of X has
ℓ > w chains. Theorem 3 asserts that there exists a partition of X into w chains
such that the corresponding enforcement scheme requires the minimum number
of secrets. We now show how such a chain partition may be constructed. In
particular, we show how to transform the problem of finding a chain partition Π
such that K̂(Π) attains the minimum value into a problem of finding a minimum
cost flow in a network.
Informally, a network is a directed graph in which each edge is associated
with a capacity. A network flow associates each edge in a given network with
a flow, which must not exceed the capacity of the edge. Networks are widely
used to model systems in which some quantity passes through channels (edges
in the network) that meet at junctions (vertices); examples include traffic in
a road system, fluids in pipes, or electrical current in circuits. In our setting,
we model an information flow policy as a network in which the capacities are
determined by the weights ω. Our definitions for networks and network flows
follow the presentation of Bang-Jensen and Gutin [5].
Definition 2. A network is a tuple N = (D, l, u, c, b), where:
– D = (V,A) is a directed graph with vertex set V and arc set A;
– l : V × V → N such that l(vv′) = 0 if vv′ 6∈ A and l(vv′) > 0 otherwise;
– u : V × V → N such that u(vv′) = 0 if vv′ 6∈ A and u(vv′) > l(vv′) > 0
otherwise;
– c : V × V → R;
– b : V → R such that
∑
v∈V b(v) = 0.
Intuitively, l and u represent lower and upper bounds, respectively, on how
much flow can pass through each arc, and c represents the cost associated with
each unit of flow in each arc. The function b represents how much flow should
12
enter or leave the network at a given vertex. If b(x) = 0, then the flow going into
x should be equal to the flow going out of x. If b(x) > 0, then there should be
b(x) more flow coming out of x than going into x. If b(x) < 0, there should be
|b(x)| more flow going into x than coming out of x.
Definition 3. Given a network N = (D, l, u, c, b), a function f : V → N is a
feasible flow for N if the following conditions are satisfied:
– u(vv′) > f(vv′) > l(vv′) for every vv′ ∈ V × V ;
–
∑
v′∈V (f(vv
′)− f(v′v)) = b(v) for every v ∈ V .
The cost of f is defined to be ∑
vv′∈A
c(vv′)f(vv′).
Our aim is to find a tree Π˜ such that Π is a chain partition of X with w
chains that minimizes K̂. To do this, we will construct a network N such that
the minimum cost flow of N corresponds to the desired tree. We can then find
the minimum cost flow of N in polynomial time.
In Π˜ , we want every vertex except r to have at most one parent and at most
one child. We cannot represent this requirement directly in a network. However,
we can use the vertex splitting procedure [5] to simulate it. Specifically, given
poset (X,6), define Xin = {xin : x ∈ X \ {r}} and Xout = {xout : x ∈ X}; and
define v′ ≺ v if and only if either v = xin and v′ = xout for some x ∈ X \ r,
or v = xout and v
′ = yin for some x, y ∈ X such that y < x. We now add a
minimum element ⊥, where ⊥ ≺ xout for all x ∈ X .
Then define D = (Xin ∪Xout ∪ {⊥} , A), where xy ∈ A if and only if y ≺ x,
and the network (D, l, u, c, b), where
l(vv′) =
{
1 if v = xin, v
′ = xout, x ∈ X \ r
0 otherwise;
u(vv′) =
{
1 if v′ ≺ v
0 otherwise;
c(vv′) =
{
ω(xy) if v = xout, v
′ = yin, y 6 x
0 otherwise;
b(v) =

w if v = rout
−w if v = ⊥
0 otherwise.
We call this network the network chain-representation of (X,6). Note that any
feasible flow f for this network must have 0 6 f(xy) 6 1 for all xy ∈ A.
Lemma 3. Let N be the network chain-representation of poset (X,6). Then
the minimum number of secrets required by a chain-based enforcement scheme
for (X,6) with w chains is w |Ur|+ f̂ , where f̂ is the minimum cost of a feasible
flow in N .
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Proof. Suppose we are given a chain partition Π with w chains. Then we may
construct the tree Π˜ . Consider the following flow:
f(xinxout) = 1 for all x ∈ X \ r;
f(xoutyin) = 1 if y ⋖Π˜ x;
f(xout⊥) = 1 if x is a bottom element in a chain in Π;
f = 0 otherwise.
Then we can show that f is a feasible flow. Indeed, by construction all arcs xy
satisfy u(xy) > f(xy) > l(xy). In the graph formed by arcs xy with f(xy) = 1,
it is clear that every vertex x has in-degree and out-degree 1, except for rout
and ⊥. As there is one element y such that y⋖
Π˜
r for each chain in Π , rout has
in-degree 0 and out-degree w in this graph, and similarly ⊥ has in-degree w and
out-degree 0. As all arcs xy have f(xy) = 1 or f(xy) = 0, we have that∑
v∈V (D)
(f(xv)− f(vx)) = b(x)
for all x, as required. Moreover, the cost of f equals
∑
x⋖
Π˜
y ω(yx).
Conversely, suppose f is a feasible flow for N . Then we define y ⋖f x if and
only if f(xout, yin) = 1. For each x ∈ X \ r, the arc xinxout is the only in-coming
arc for xout and the only out-going arc for xin in D, and by definition of N ,
f(xinxout) = 1. As b(xin) = b(xout) = 0 and all in-coming arcs for xin are of the
form youtxin, it follows that there is exactly one element y ∈ X such that x⋖f y,
and at most one element z ∈ X such that z⋖f x. As b(rout) = w and rout has no
in-coming arcs in D, and all its out-going arcs are of the form routxin, there are
exactly w elements y such that y⋖f r. Let these elements be labelled t1, . . . , tw.
Now choose an arbitrary i, 1 6 i 6 w, and define y⋖Π x if and only if x = r
and y = ti, or x 6= r and y⋖f x. Then for every element x ∈ X , there is at most
one element y ∈ X such that x⋖Π y, and at most one element z ∈ X such that
z ⋖Π x.
It is easy to see that 6Π , the reflexive, transitive closure of ⋖Π , defines a
chain partition of X . (Observe that as D is an acyclic digraph, the transitive
reflexive closure of ⋖Π is antisymmetric, and therefore a partial order. The fact
that (X,6Π) is a chain partition can be shown by induction on |X |, considering
X with a minimal element removed for the induction step.) By construction,
the only maximal elements for 6Π are r and the elements tj for j 6= i. Thus,
(X,6Π) has w chains.
Recall the definition of ⋖
Π˜
, that y⋖
Π˜
x if and only if either y⋖Π x, or y = tj ,
j 6= i, and x = r. Note that ⋖
Π˜
is exactly the relation ⋖f . By Theorem 2, the
number of secrets required by Π is
w |Ur|+
∑
z⋖
Π˜
y
ω(yz).
As z ⋖
Π˜
y if and only if f(youtzin) = 1, c(youtzin) = ω(yz), and c(uv) = 0 for all
other arcs with f(uv) = 1, we have that
∑
z⋖
Π˜
y ω(yz) is exactly the cost of f ,
as required. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 4. We can find a minimum cost flow for N in O(|X |4w) time.
Proof. The Negative Cycle algorithm (see [1, §5.3], for example) finds a minimum
cost flow for a network with n vertices and m arcs in time O(nm2CU), where C
denotes the maximum cost on an arc, and U denotes the maximum of all upper
bounds on arcs and the absolute values of all balance demands on vertices. By
construction of N , we have that n = 2|X | = O(|X |), m = O(n2) = O(|X |2),
C = max {ω(xy) : xy ∈ E∗0} = O(|X |), U = 1 and C = w. Thus we get the
desired running time. ⊓⊔
Remark 4. Strictly speaking, the Negative Cycle algorithm assumes that all
lower bounds on arcs are 0. However, we can satisfy this assumption, given
N = (D, l, u, c, b), by defining the network N ′ = (D, l′, u′, c, b′), where
l′(xy) = 0 b′(x) = b(x)− l(xy)
u′(xy) = u(xy)− l(xy) b′(y) = b(y) + l(xy)
Then the minimum cost flow f ′ for N ′ will have cost exactly
∑
xy l(xy)c(xy) less
than the minimum cost flow for N , and f ′ can be transformed into a minimum
cost feasible flow f for N by setting f(xy) = f ′(xy) + l(xy).
We are now able to prove our main result, which is, essentially, a corollary
of Theorem 3 and Lemmas 3 and 4.
Proof (of Theorem 1). By Theorem 3, there exists a chain partition that has
exactly w chains, for which the corresponding chain-based enforcement scheme
only requires K̂ secrets. Then by Lemma 3, K̂ is equal to the minimum cost of
a feasible flow in N , the network chain-representation of (X,6). By Lemma
4, such a flow can be found in O(|X |4w) time, and this flow can be easily
transformed into the corresponding chain partition Π . Finally, by definition of
φ(x,Π), |φ(x,Π)| ≤ w for each x ∈ X and therefore kmax 6 w. ⊓⊔
5 Concluding Remarks
Cryptographic enforcement schemes (CESs) fall into two broad categories: those
that use symmetric cryptographic primitives and those that use asymmetric
ones (notably attribute-based encryption [6, 17]). The focus of this paper is on
symmetric schemes, which may be characterized by(i) the total number of secrets
required, (ii) the number of secrets required per user, (iii) the total amount of
public information required for the derivation of secrets, and (iv) the number of
derivation steps required.
Until recently, symmetric CESs for information flow policies have assumed
each user would be given a single secret, from which other secrets and decryp-
tion keys would be derived using public information generated by the scheme
administrator (see, for example, [3, 11]). In this setting, there is a considerable
literature on the trade-offs that are possible by reducing the number of steps
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required for the derivation of secrets, at the cost of increasing the amount of
public information (see, for example, [4, 8, 12]).
One drawback of these types of CESs is that the administrator must generate
and publish information to facilitate the derivation of secrets (and decryption
keys). Moreover, the amount of public information required may be substantial,
particularly when security labels are defined in terms of (subsets of) attributes.
Chain-based CESs obviate the requirement for public information, the trade-
off being that each user may require several secrets. The chain-based approach
may well be much more practical, particularly if the poset is large and its Hasse
diagram contains many edges (as in a powerset, for example). Moreover, chain-
based CESs may be implemented using one-way functions, typically the fastest
of cryptographic primitives in practice.
However, it was not known which choice of chain partition was most appro-
priate for a given information flow policy. Our work provides formal and practical
methods for constructing a chain partition with the smallest number of keys in
total, with the additional property that no user is required to have more than
w keys, where w is the width of the information flow policy.
One question remains: If there exist multiple chain partitions that minimize
the number of keys in total and per-user, which of these should we choose and
can we compute it efficiently? The one parameter that our work does not address
is the number of derivation steps d required by a user in the worst case. Our
future work, then, will attempt to find a polynomial-time or fixed-parameter
algorithm that takes a poset as input and outputs a chain partition into w chains
that minimizes d. We also hope to investigate whether the insight provided by
Lemma 2—that K̂(Π) is completely determined by the bottom elements in Π—
can be exploited to design an algorithm whose performance improves on that of
the algorithm described in Section 4.
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